The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Regional Firms by Yoon, Hyejoon
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects 
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects 
Spring 5-1-2009 
The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Regional Firms 
Hyejoon Yoon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yoon, Hyejoon, "The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Regional Firms" (2009). Syracuse University 
Honors Program Capstone Projects. 475. 
https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/475 
This Honors Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Syracuse University Honors Program 
Capstone Projects at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone 
Projects by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There have been major audit failures involving the largest companies such as 
Enron, WorldCom and Tyco.  As a result of these audit failures, Arthur Andersen no 
longer exists and the audit failures have raised serious concerns about audit quality.  
In order to prevent future potential audit failures, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
passed in 2002 to establish enhanced standards for oversight of accounting 
professionals, including U.S. public company boards, management, and public 
accounting firms. In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act limits consulting services 
performed by CPA firms to improve auditor independence.   
 After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, there was increased attention on 
major public accounting firms regarding audit quality, audit pricing, independence, 
risk assessment, and legal liabilities. Research conducted by Hoitash, Markelevich, 
and Barragato found that the quality of audits has improved and the price of audits 
increased following the passage of the Act.  Public companies have been restricted 
from utilizing their own accounting firms for such services as advisory and some tax 
services.  In order to maintain their independence, three of the four major accounting 
firms sold their consulting practices, even though consulting practices are again 
growing rapidly.   Interestingly, however, there has been little research focusing on 
the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on private companies and smaller audit firms. 
Given the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this study examines whether the effects 
of the Act extend to private companies and their audit firms in the Central New York 
market.   
 
II. BACKGROUND 
The accounting profession has been challenged with independence issues 
and the quality of audits.  Audit quality concerns have been raised dramatically since 
the increasing number of audit failures from the largest audit firms in the early 
2000s.  Because public accounting firms play major roles in ascertaining the validity 
and reliability of financial information, the quality of audits is important to 
shareholders, stockholders, and internal management teams.  The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission expressed its concern about potential audit independence 
issues arising from non-audit services.  Many researchers have conducted studies of 
the relation between measures of audit quality and auditor independence.     
A. Audit Quality 
The term “audit quality” is not easily defined, and audit quality can be 
defined from different perspectives.  Epstein and Geiger (1994) find that auditors are 
considered to be the highest level of assurance for investors.  Over 70% of investors 
expect no material misstatements or fraud in financial statements examined by 
independent auditors.  On the other hand, auditors strive to provide high quality 
audits to avoid litigation, limit negative reputation effects, and maximize client 
satisfaction.  Two measures of audit quality are audit firm size and the knowledge 
and skills of the members of the audit team.     
Audit Firm Size 
 DeAngelo (1981) asserted larger audit firms provided higher quality audits 
to maintain their reputation.  The perception of larger audit firms providing higher 
quality audits plays a major role in attracting and attaining clients.  In order to obtain 
a great reputation, larger firms invested in developing extensive control systems so 
that their audit quality performances were the best possible.  The better and updated 
technologies used in Big Four audit firms detect going concern issues more 
accurately, which results in an aggressive stance in issuing the appropriate opinion 
(Wooten, 2003).  DeAngelo also argued that larger audit firms have higher audit 
quality because of their greater level of independence, which will be discussed later 
in the paper.   
 Another measure of audit quality is litigation outcomes.  Palmrose (1988) 
examined 472 legal cases from 1960 to 1985. She found that the larger accounting 
firms were less often involved in litigation compared to non-Big Four audit 
companies.  Palmrose concluded that the lower amount of litigation against large 
audit firms was due to their higher audit quality.  Wooten (2003) drew the 
relationship that less litigation exposure generates more wealth for clients, and also 
provides justification for Big Four audit firms to charge a premium fee.  The 
premium fee allows larger firms to provide more incentives and benefits to attract 
skilled employees.   
Audit Team 
 Carcello, Hermanson, and McGarth (1992) emphasized the important role of 
audit teams in providing high audit quality.  Partners and managers focus on 
supervising staff members, reviewing, and signing off on important workpapers.  
The attention provided by partners and managers helps ensure high audit quality.  
For instance, Tommy O’Connell was a senior auditor in charge of a project at the 
Altamesa Manfacturing facility.  When an inexperienced staff auditor, Carl 
Wilmeth, handed in his work incomplete, O’Connell had to spend extra hours 
tracking down missing invoices and late confirmations.  The premature signoff 
became a concern in this case due to the time pressure and the limited budget; 
however, there was no litigation involved.  The Tommy O’Connell case illustrates 
the important role of managers and partners as reviewers of work completed by 
inexperienced staff members.  
 As Houghton and Fogarty found in their research, many inherent errors 
were detected in the early stage.  In order to identify errors before the actual audit 
starts, auditors’ knowledge and experience are critical.  Auditors with greater 
industry knowledge provide more accurate assessments of inherent risk that are 
critical to designing effective audit plans.   
B. Auditor Independence  
 Even though auditing remains the largest practice unit of audit firms, 
consulting services and tax services on average contributed 32% and 22%, 
respectively to firms’ revenues  in 2008 (Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz, 2008). A 
large portion of the auditor fee comes from non-audit services. Some argue that the 
magnitude of non-audit fees could cause a reduction in auditor independence. 
Fee Sources and Independence in Appearance 
 The large profits generated by non-audit services could negatively impact 
audit firm independence.  In order to enhance the independence of the audit 
function, keeping auditors independent to all users is important by avoiding any 
situations that lead outsiders to doubt auditors’ independence (Burton, 1980).  
Because of the auditor independence appearance concerns, in 2002 Walt Disney, 
Inc. declared that it would refuse to buy any non-audit services from the accounting 
firm that audits its financial statements (Glater, 2002).  The concern is that auditors 
might go easy on a client that is paying a large amount of consulting fees.  For 
example, when Enron went bankrupt, the question occurred because Enron paid 
Andersen $25 million for its audit, while the consulting services cost $27 million 
(Glater, 2002).   
As a result of Enron and other alleged audit failures, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
was signed in 2002.  Section 201 clearly restricts many non-audit services provided 
by accounting firms to audit clients.  Even though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits 
bookkeeping, legal services, or actuarial services, it does not completely prohibit 
consulting services.  In the period leading up to Enron’s collapse, Big 4 audit firms 
started to separate their consulting businesses.  For instance, Ernst & Young sold its 
consulting services to Cap Gemini, and KPMG shed its consulting through a public 
stock offering.   
Since the major role of auditors is providing assurance to investors, the 
quality of audits helps determine whether a company will be able to avoid 
litigation, limit negative reputation effects, and maximize client satisfaction.   
Larger audit companies tend to provide a higher quality of audits to maintain their 
positive reputation and retain their clients.  In addition, if an audit team is 
knowledgeable of the industry, there are more accurate predictions of inherent 
risks, which lead to higher quality of audits.  Auditor independence is another 
component to determine the audit quality.  The more independent audit companies 
are, the higher the audit quality.  In order to maintain independence, non-audit 
services provided by audit companies are strongly prohibited.   
C. Enron  
Between 2000 and 2002, a series of large corporate frauds occurred due to a 
variety of complex factors that created the conditions and culture for fraud.  Enron 
Creditors Recovery Corporation (Enron) was an American leading energy company 
based in Houston, Texas.  It employed approximately 22,000 (McLean & Elkind, 
2003) and Fortune magazine named Enron as “America’s Most Innovative 
Company” for six consecutive years in the 1990s.  In late 2001, a financial scandal 
involving Enron and its accounting firm Arthur Andersen was revealed.   
In 2000, Enron reported revenue of $101 billion.  Enron was able to boost its 
revenues because the Congress of the United States of America passed legislation 
deregulating the sale of electricity and natural gas in the early 1990s.  By creating 
special purpose entities, Enron was able to avoid taxes and raise the profitability of 
the business.  Creating special purpose entities such as Bob West Treasure, Jedi, and 
Hawaii gave Enron the freedom to move currency and anonymity so that losses of 
the company could be taken off the balance sheet, which made Enron look more 
profitable than it actually was.  As a result, it created a spiral each quarter so that 
officers needed to create the illusion of billions in profits while the company was 
actually facing losses.  Even though executives and investors knew about the 
offshore accounts, they continued insider Enron stock trading that was worth 
millions of dollars.    
In November 1999, Enron launched EnronOnline, an Internet-based 
transaction system, that permitted buyers and sellers to buy, sell, and trade products 
globally.  In order to create a user-friendly website, EnronOnline operated just like a 
stock ticker that allowed participants to see prices on their screen.  Natural gas and 
electricity were the most common commodities traded in EnronOnline.  Because 
Enron was not involved with buying, selling, or trading in every transaction, it used 
the mark-to-mark accounting method, which calculates the value of financial 
instruments held based on the current market price.  With the technology boom, 
Enron was able to manipulate the price of its stock on Wall Street and recorded 
gains from what could have been losses.   
The concerns of the company started to rise on August 14, 2001, when 
Jeffrey Skilling, the chief executive of Enron, announced his resignation after only 
six months with the firm.  Skilling sold 450,000 Enron shares worth $33 million.  
Kenneth Lay, the chairman at Enron, announced there was “absolutely no 
accounting issue, no trading issue, no reserve issue, no previously unknown problem 
issues” involved in Skilling’s departure.  Furthermore, Lay reassured investors that 
there would be “no changes in the performance or outlook of the company going 
forward” (Lay, 2001).   In the New York Times, Paul Krugman attacked Enron as an 
illustration of the consequences of the deregulation and commoditization of energy.   
 With the falling stock prices, Enron announced a loss in the third-quarter in 
2001.  The executives explained the losses were caused by investment losses and 
other losses in their core energy businesses.  When the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission announced its investigation of Enron’s suspicious deals, the share price 
of Enron fell from $20.65 to $5.40 in one day, on October 22, 2001.  The Enron 
executives announced their full participation in the investigation to clear up any 
concerns of their transactions.   
 In November 2001, Enron executives started looking for new investment or 
a buyout.  Enron management was able to find Dynergy, another energy company 
based in Houston, TX.  On November 8, 2001, Dynergy and Enron made a deal for 
Dynergy to provide Enron $2.5 billion in cash.  A couple of days after the deal, 
Enron announced its plan to sell $8 billion worth of underperforming assets.   
 Even with these optimistic plans, Dynergy disengaged from the acquisition.  
In addition to the disengagement, Enron’s credit rating was slightly above the lowest 
level and the company had $23 billion in liabilities.  On December 1, 2001, Enron 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  As a result of the bankruptcy, Arthur Andersen’s 
audits were receiving attention.   
 On June 15, 2002, Arthur Andersen was convicted of shredding Enron 
related documents as an obstruction of justice.  As a result of this conviction, Arthur 
Andersen agreed to surrender its Certified Public Accountant licenses.  It was 
questioned whether Arthur Andersen maintained its integrity and independence from 
its audit client, which paid $25 million for its audit but $27 million in consulting 
service fees (Glater 2002).  Although the Supreme Court of the United States 
overturned Andersen’s conviction, Arthur Andersen was not able to recover from 
the negative impact on its reputation.  With Arthur Andersen’s downfall, there are 
only four big accounting firms.   
 
D. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 In response to a number of major corporate and accounting scandals, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act, was signed on July 30, 2002.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
combined the accounting reform bills of Senator Sarbanes and Representative 
Oxley.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains 11 titles, which specify mandatory 
requirements in reporting financial statements.  A key provision of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) in Title I.   In order to provide independent oversight of public accounting 
firms that offer audit services, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established the PCAOB.  The 
PCAOB establishes standards for auditing, ethics, independence, and quality control 
for public company audits, and it inspects the quality of audit firms.   
 Title II emphasizes independence of external auditors to limit conflicts of 
interest.  It requires audit partner rotation every five years, auditor reporting 
requirements, and new auditor approval requirements.  Title II restricts public 
accounting firms from providing non-audit services to their clients, including 
bookkeeping services, financial information systems design and implementation, 
valuation services, investment advising, legal services, and any other services that 
the Board determines are impermissible.   
 Corporate responsibility is listed in Title III to enhance the accuracy and 
completeness of corporate financial reports.  The company’s principal officers, such 
as the Chief Executive Officer or Chief Financial Officer, are obligated to certify 
and review the annual reports to ensure the integrity of the company’s financial 
matters.  Furthermore, it specifies the limits of the specific forfeitures of benefits, 
civil penalties for non-compliance, and the interaction of external auditors and 
corporate audit committees.   
 Title IV focuses more on enhancing reporting requirements for financial 
transactions, especially an emphasis on the importance of periodic reports and 
disclosures.  It requires the financial statement issuers to disclose the adoption of a 
code of ethics for senior financial officers and adequate reasons if the code of ethics 
has been omitted.  Furthermore, the rule requires that the company disclose if its 
audit committee does not have at least one financial expert to ensure the quality of 
financial statements.  Section 404 of Title IV requires auditors to report on 
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls.  According to 
many previous research studies, this requirement resulted in a substantial increase in 
audit fees.   
 Unlike other titles, Title V only consists of one section, which defines the 
codes of conduct for securities analysis and requires disclosure of conflicts of 
interest.  In order to restore investor confidence in securities analysis, Title VI 
emphasizes authorization of appropriations and appearance and practice before the 
commission.  Identifying inappropriate professional conduct made clear what results 
in a violation of professional standards.  
 Title VII narrates the various studies conducted and their findings.  The 
study fields include credit rating agencies, report violations, investment banking and 
enforcement actions.  These findings prove the importance of consolidation of public 
accounting firms and the role of credit rating agencies in the operation of securities 
markets.   
 Title VIII explains the accountability in corporate and criminal frauds.  It 
describes punishments and penalties due to criminal manipulation, destruction and 
alternation of financial records.  In addition to Title VIII, Title IX describes the 
possible consequences of white collar crimes.  It suggests enhanced sentencing 
guidelines such as a fine up to $5,000,000 and imprisonment up to 20 years.   
 Title X simply requires the Chief Executive Officer to sign the company’s 
tax returns.  Lastly, Title XI describes corporate fraud accountability.  It gives the 
power to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to freeze large or unusual 
payments made by companies temporarily.  In addition, the SEC can prohibit certain 
people from serving as an officer of a public company due to previous fraud 
attempts.  As a result, Title XI increases criminal penalties under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.   
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its enhanced new procedures changed the 
relations between many U.S. companies and their investors.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act has been praised for improving investor confidence and providing more accurate 
and reliable financial statements.  By prohibiting auditors from having a consulting 
agreement with the audit client, Section 201 addresses potential auditor conflicts of 
interest.  SEC Chairman Christopher Cox believes, “Sarbanes-Oxley helped restore 
confidence in U.S. markets by increasing accountability, speeding up reporting, and 
making audits more independent” (Cox, 2007).  Due to the law’s restrictions, there 
were 1,295 restatements of financial earnings in 2005 among companies listed on 
U.S. securities markets, which was double the amount from 2004.  These 
restatements show that previous audit reports were inaccurate or materially 
misstated.  Therefore, the SEC subcommittee believes the restatement should 
include facts such as how it was discovered, why it occurred, and corrective actions 
that were taken by the company to prevent the error in the future (SEC, 2007).  After 
announcing restatements, 60 percent of restating firms face a turnover of a top 
executive within 24 months, which leads to a negative reputation and lowering the 
total earnings of the firm (Desai, Hogan and Wilkins, 2006). Despite a few praises 
regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there are many criticisms as well.  Congressman 
Ron Paul believes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “damaged American capital markets by 
providing an incentive for small U.S. firms and foreign firms to deregister from U.S. 
stock exchanges” (Paul, 2004).   According to Wharton Business School research, 
there were only 10 new foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange in 2004, 
and many companies decided to deregister after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  On 
December 21, 2008, the Wall Street Journal criticized “the new laws and regulations 
have neither prevented frauds nor instituted fairness.  But they have managed to kill 
the creation of new public companies in the U.S., cripple the venture capital 
business, and damage entrepreneurship” (Wall Street Journal, 2008).     
F. Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act not only provides for confidence in financial 
statements, it increases legal liability of accountants.  In the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
era, auditors faced liability only when a client company collapsed.  Nevertheless, 
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, auditors can potentially face legal consequences for a 
failure in a PCAOB inspection.  The regulation by the PCAOB changed the audit 
regulatory system.  As a result, auditors can be suspended, terminated or sentenced 
to 20 years in prison for purposefully destroying documents.  Furthermore, an 
auditor’s wrongful actions prohibit the auditor from performing audits of public 
companies (Wegman, 2005).   
 The major finding in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act era is the increase in audit 
fees.  Among the S&P 500 companies, the audit fee increased 27% from 2001 to 
2002, 24% from 2002 to 2003 (Foley and Lardner, 2004), and 55% from 2003 to 
2004 (Foley and Lardner, 2005).  In addition, between 2001 and 2004, total audit 
and audit-related fees increased 103% for 496 companies from the S&P 500 
companies.  One of the causes for the fee increase is internal control reporting under 
Section 404.  The report on internal controls requires a new set of procedures and 
related costs to the standard audit.  According to the CEO of Deloitte USA, the 
firm’s clients experienced audit fee increases of approximately 40 percent from 2003 
to 2004 (Whitehouse, 2005).  These dramatic increases in costs are mainly due to 
additional work imposed upon clients.   
 Despite the increase in audit fees, some local and regional audit firms 
discontinued performing SEC audits after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed.  In 
2002 and 2003, 25 out of the 47 audit firms that participated in a research study 
ceased SEC audit work.  In total, about 7 percent of small audit firms ceased SEC 
audits.  The primary reason for leaving the public company audit market was the 
oversight process of the PCAOB.  The second primary factor given for leaving the 
market was availability and cost of liability insurance in the post Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act era.  After ceasing the SEC audits, ten responders are not expecting any decline 
in their revenue because they are planning to offer other services to their clients.  On 
the other hand, eighteen firms are expecting to experience a 5 to 20 percent loss in 
their revenue (Read, Rama, and Raghunandan, 2004).   
 Regardless of ceasing SEC audits and expecting to provide more “other 
services,” from 2001 to 2004, accounting firms experienced a major decrease in “all 
other fees,” which include fees for financial systems design and implementation. 
One of the major reasons, however, is due to the selling off of consulting services.  
Starting from 2003, auditing became a major source of revenue for accounting firms 
due to the additional responsibility of signing off on internal control systems.  
Accounting firms reported eighty-two percent of their audit-firm billings are 
generated by auditing.  Despite the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act banned 
accounting firms from providing non-auditing services, these firms can still offer 
these services to non-audit clients (Ciesielski, 2006).   
 Due to these impacts of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, I am interested in finding 
the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on private and local firms.  In 
particular, I investigate perceived changes in fees and quality in the local audit 
market after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
 
III. METHOD 
A. Survey Instrument 
 The first phase of the study involved developing specific questions that 
relate to audit quality, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and audit pricing.  Audit quality 
and pricing were two key elements identified from reviewing the articles and 
literature, especially DeAngelo.  In order to obtain information related to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, current articles and newspapers were used to broaden my 
understanding.   
 Questions were developed to determine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act on regional companies, concentrated in the Central New York area.  
Questions were aimed at determining whether the company used Big Four or local 
accounting firms to audit their financial statements.  If their financial statements 
are not audited by auditors, another question followed asking whether financial 
statements were reviewed by an accounting firm. A review provides less 
assurance than an audit on the fairness of the financial statements.  Some 
questions were designed to determine the changes in perceived audit quality, audit 
fees, and auditor independence due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Additional 
questions addressed the level of satisfaction with the audit services to assess 
whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has positively affected audit quality in the local 
audit market.  
 There have been numerous research studies done to determine how public 
companies and major accounting firms have reacted to the change in accounting 
rules.  Nevertheless, due to limited access to information, the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on private companies has not been widely studied.  
Therefore, the main intention from the questionnaire is to gather the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on private companies in one local market.   
The questionnaire contains 19 attributes, which rate client satisfaction with 
the auditor, as well as the auditor’s knowledge. Survey participants were asked to 
evaluate the degree of impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on their company.  If 
there was a change in accounting firm within the last 5 years, the questionnaire 
asked about the reason for the change in auditors.  In addition, questions 
addressed the level of audit quality, audit and other fees, and the knowledge of the 
accounting firms to determine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  The audit 
quality attributes included in the questionnaire, and the scale responses format, 
are presented in the Appendix.  Out of these 19 questions, 15 questions are 
qualitative while only four questions focused on quantitative data such as audit 
and non-audit services fees.  Qualitative questions were designed to find the 
changes in audit quality, service satisfaction, and independence.  Quantitative 
questions were designed to measure how much these local companies spent on 
audit and non-audit services for fiscal year 2007.   
The second phase of the survey involved sending out the actual survey 
questionnaires. A total of 112 surveys were sent to advertising agencies, 
architectural firms, banks, building supply companies, and commercial builders 
industries on September 26, 2008.  Surveys were sent to 168 commercial builders, 
commercial printing companies, credit unions, cultural and performing art 
organizations, durable medical equipment suppliers, and employment benefit 
consultant industries on October 3, 2008.  The first response was received on 
September 30, 2008 and the last response was received on January 6, 2009.  
Responses to 126 out of 429 questionnaires were received over a 15-week period. 
The response rate of approximately 29% is typical of survey research.    
B. Participants 
 Questionnaires were sent to the Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial 
Officers, or the president of companies.  The names and addresses of these 
officers were obtained from Business Journal: Central New York, Book of List 
2008.  Among the 52 industries included in this publication, 17 industries were 
selected based on the size of the industry.  These industries are: advertising 
agencies, architectural firms, banks, building supply companies, commercial 
builders, commercial printing companies, credit unions, cultural and performing 
art organizations, durable medical equipment suppliers, employment benefit 
consultants, employment placement agencies, engineering firms, environmental 
consulting firms, law firms, residential builders, software developers, and web-
design and development firms.   
 
IV. HYPOTHESIS 
A. Level of Audit Fees  
Due to increases in effort and resource constraints, there was a significant 
increase in audit fees after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  In the 
post the Sarbanes-Oxley era, it is mandatory for publicly traded companies to 
have their financial statements and effectiveness of internal control audited by 
public accounting firms (Ettredge, Li and Scholz, 2007).   
In order to keep the audit fee stable, clients who used a Big 4 auditor may 
substitute smaller or lower cost auditors.  These clients that change their auditors 
appear to be small enough to feasibly hire a non-Big 4 auditor to continuously 
audit their financial statements.  This dismissal is in favor of either a national or a 
regional auditor.  In 2006, PricewaterhouseCoopers announce that it experienced 
fee increases; however, there will be cost savings, efficiencies and assessment 
requirements because auditors and clients gained experience with post-Sarbanes-
Oxley Act audits.   
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not apply to private companies, it 
created a large increase in audit demand that likely affected the entire industry. As 
a result, even private companies likely experienced increased audit fees. The first 
hypothesis addresses the effect of the Act on audit fees. 
H1A: Private companies experienced an increase in audit fees due to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   
 
DeAngelo found that audit fees are lower for initial audit engagements to 
attract clients, but auditors may reduce the extent of audit procedures 
commensurate with the lower audit fee.  Changing auditors for the client is costly, 
so the lower fee compensates clients for switching auditors.  In addition, 
DeAngelo argues that the auditors earn a quasi-rent stream in later years for 
lowering their initial audit bids.  Even though clients can maintain low audit fees 
by constantly changing auditors, it might affect their reputation and cost in a start-
up investment relationships.   
On the basis of the preceding discussion, I state the following hypothesis:  
H1B: The increase in audit fees will be lower for companies that 
changed auditors over the past five years compared to companies 
that did not change auditors.   
 
B. Level of Audit Quality   
 Integrity and objectivity are a part of the profession’s ability to enhance 
auditor independence.  The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) requires auditors to “retain their integrity and objectivity in all phases of 
their practices and, when expressing opinions on financial statements, avoid 
involvement in situations that would impair the credibility of their independence” 
(28) and it is discussed in the Professional Ethics Executive Committee Meetings.  
DeAngelo (1981) argued larger audit firms have greater independence because each 
client is immaterial to the company.  Immateriality makes the audit firms resist client 
pressure.  On the other hand, DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) 
indicated one of regulators’ concerns is that auditors may be willing to sacrifice 
independence to retain clients that pay large auditor fees.  These researchers were 
able to examine the association between non-audit services and auditor 
independence.  Contrary to DeAngelo’s argument, DeFond’s research suggested that 
fees could potentially influence the auditor’s independence by creating an economic 
bond.   
 The lower fees for initial audit engagements are a possible result from 
lowballing.  Deis and Giroux (1992, 1996) found that there was higher audit 
quality on initial audit engagements in the government sector.  Even though these 
research studies related to the governmental sector found evidence of higher audit 
quality for initial audit engagements, I believe lower costs are the result of less 
audit hours spent by audit teams, which could possibly lower the audit quality.   
Hoitash, Hoitash, and Bedard provided a reason for audit fee increases 
regardless of whether internal control problems were disclosed by public 
companies under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  They concluded that auditors 
increased testing to address control problems.  Auditors are assessing the 
possibilities of risks that were not previously disclosed under control problems.  
Hoitash, Markelevich and Barragato conducted the research during the period 
2000-2003 to find the relationship between total fees and audit quality over years.  
The research time period is very interesting because there were sweeping changes 
in the accounting professional environment.  They claimed that increases in total 
fees will enhance auditor independence, which will lead to an increase in audit 
quality.  Therefore, I state the following hypothesis.   
H2: The level of audit quality will increase as the level of audit fees 
increases. 
 
C. Client Satisfaction  
I am also interested in finding whether the client’s satisfaction with the 
audit quality provided by the audit firm depends on the accounting firm’s industry 
knowledge, familiarity with the client’s internal control, client’s industry, and the 
valuable suggestions provided to management.   
Daugherty and Tervo used S&P 500 companies to find the relationship 
between auditor changes and client satisfaction.  They found that a recent change 
in auditors reduces the respondent’s satisfaction level with the professional 
services provided by the auditor compared to respondents not experiencing a 
change.  In addition, they found there are no differences in client satisfaction 
regardless of the level of audit fees.  One the other hand, some studies found that 
the audit fee is one of the significant drivers of client satisfaction.  As the result of 
the loss of Arthur Andersen, the number of ‘Big’ audit firms has declined, while 
the number of publicly traded companies stayed constant.  Therefore, clients have 
lost the leverage to select their audit firms. Due to higher audit fees and reduction 
in the number of large audit firms, client satisfaction is a daunting task 
(Daugherty and Tervo, 2005).   
Carcello et al. (1992) used 653 sample responses from Fortune 1000 
companies to examine important factors in determining audit quality.  Their 
research reported the four most critical factors for high audit quality: the 
experience of the audit team, auditor experience and knowledge in the industry, 
responsiveness to client needs and compliance with the general audit standards.  
Industry specialization on audit engagements enhances the quality of audit.  They 
found that the audit team and firm experience with the client is the most important 
factor in determining audit quality.   
Some researchers argue that “the price of the service can greatly influence 
perceptions of quality, satisfaction, and value.  Because services are intangible 
and are often difficult to judge before purchase, price is frequently relied on as a 
surrogate indicator that will influence quality expectations and perceptions” 
(Zeithaml and Bitner, 2000).  Behn, Carcello and Hermmanson (1997) examined 
the relationship between audit quality attributes and client satisfaction.  They 
found that client satisfaction with the audit team has a positive relationship with 
the audit fee paid by Fortune 1000 clients. Based on previous studies, I state the 
following hypotheses.   
H3A: The client’s satisfaction with the accounting firm will increase 
with the accounting firm’s knowledge of the client’s internal 
control and ability to provide valuable suggestions. 
  H3B: The client’s satisfaction with the accounting firm will decrease 
with the level of audit fees.  
 These research hypotheses will be examined using both univariate tests 
and multivariate models that control for other factors that impact audit quality, 
client satisfaction, and audit fees. 
 
V. Model Development  
 To test the hypotheses, three regression models are used to examine the 
impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on regional firms. In order to measure different 
effects of qualitative data, a logistic model is used in this research. It is a 
regression model for ordinal dependent variables measuring categorical variables.  
The following dependent variables are examined: (1) the change in the level of 
audit fees, (2) the level of audit quality, and (3) client satisfaction.   
 
A. Fee Model 
The first model is designed to find the relationship between the change in 
the level of audit fees and certain audit attributes.  The control variables that are 
used in this model are based on previous research related to audit fees, quality, 
and satisfaction.  The model for the perceived change in the level of audit fees is 
as follows (variables are defined in table 1):  
LEVELAFEE = b0 + b1 FSAPUB + b2 FSREV + b3 INTAUD + b4 
CHANGE5YR + b5 AMTHRS + b6 QUALITYA + b7 
SATWQUAL + b8 0NONE +b9 1TAX +b10 2CONS + b11 
3BOOK + b12 4OTHER+ ε 
B. Quality Model 
The second model represents the change in audit quality provided by 
independent accounting firms.  This model used the same variables except 
QUALITYA is the dependent variable instead of LEVELAFEE. The following is 
the estimated logistical regression:  
QUALITYA = b0 + b1 FSAPUB + b2 FSREV + b3 INTAUD + b4 
CHANGE5YR + b5 AMTHRS + b6 LEVELAFEE + b7 
SATWQUAL + b8 0NONE +b9 1TAX +b10 2CONS + b11 
3BOOK + b12 4OTHER+ ε 
C. Perceived Satisfaction Model 
The third model reflects client satisfaction with the audit services provided 
by the accounting firm.  QUALITYA, AMTHRS and LEVELAFEE are not used 
in this model because these three variables measure changes.  Instead, 
INTCONTRL, INDUST, and VALUSUGGEST are used to enhance the 
relationship of the regression model.  For the measure of satisfaction, I estimated 
the following logistical regression:   
SATWQUAL = b0 + b1 FSAPUB + b2 FSREV + b3 INTAUD + b4 
YEARSACCFIRM + b5 CHANGE5YR + b6 0NONE + b7 
1TAX + b8 2CONS +b9 3BOOK +b104OTHER + b11 
INTCONTRL+ b12 INDUST+ b13VALUSUGGEST + ε 
Model variables are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Summary of variables         
Dependent variable, measured on a 5-point scale     
Name Construct or Concept measured     
LEVELAFEE The level of audit fees change     
QUALITYA The change in audit quality provided by the accounting firm  
      
Dependent variable, measured on a 10-point scale    
Name Construct or Concept measured     
SATWQUHL Client satisfaction with the quality of audit firm   
      
Independent variables, measured dichotomously    
Name Construct or Concept measured     
FSAPUB Financial statements audited by a public accounting firm  
FSREV Financial statements reviewed by an accounting firm   
INTAU Internal audit function in the company    
0NONE Not utilizing any other services provided by the accounting firm  
1TAX Utilizing tax service provided by the accounting firm   
2CONS Utilizing consulting service provided by the accounting firm  
3BOOK Utilizing bookkeeping service provided by the accounting firm  
4OTHER Utilizing other service provided by the accounting firm  
      
Independent variables, measured on a 5-point scale    
Name Construct or Concept measured     
AMTHRS The amount of audit hours spent by the accounting firm  
 
      
Independent variables, measured on a 10-point scale    
Name Construct or Concept measured     
INTCONTRL Accounting firm's knowledge and familiarity with client's internal control 
INDUST Accounting firm's knowledge of the client's industry  
VALUSUGGES Valuable suggestions provided by the accounting firm   
      
Other independent variables     
Name Construct or Concept measured     
CHANGE5YR Change of an accounting firm within last 5 years   
OSERV Other services utilizing from the accounting firm     
 
D. Dependent Variables 
In this research, three different variables measure the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on regional firms.  These are the level of change in audit fee, 
quality of audit, and client satisfaction.   
The first dependent variable, LEVELAFEE, measures changes in audit 
fees over the period.  Given the nature of the study, the judgment of individuals 
with knowledge and in a position to observe the changes in the audit fee is 
required.  Since 2002, S&P 500 companies experienced a major increase in the 
audit fee due to additional work required such as the Section 404 report on 
internal control (Foley and Lardner, 2005).  Since private companies are not 
required to follow the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its procedures, LEVELAFEE will 
provide measure of how the market changes triggered by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
have impacted local firms.   
The second dependent variable, QUALITYA, is based on respondents’ 
perceptions of the change in audit quality provided by accounting firms after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  If the level of audit fee has increased after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the quality of audits provided by accounting firms should also have 
increased.  An increase in total fees leads to an increase in audit quality because 
the fee enhances auditor effort and audit independence (Hoitash, Markelevich and 
Baragato, 2005).  If clients have experienced a decrease in audit fee, it might be a 
result from lowballiing, which lowers the level of audit quality (Deis and Giroux, 
1992, 1996).   
The last dependent variable, SATWQUHL, is also based on audit clients’ 
judgment and it captures client satisfaction with the audit quality that is provided 
by an accounting firm on a level from one to ten.  Zeithaml and Bitner (2000) 
suggest that the audit fee will be the most influential factor of determining client 
satisfaction because the audit service is intangible and is difficult to measure.   
 These dependent variables measure clients’ perceptions and capture 
perceived audit fees, quality and satisfaction after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  These 
variables are subject to respondents’ opinion.  Therefore, it moves beyond the 
effect of the audit firm’s reputation on audit fees, quality and satisfaction.   
E. Control Variables 
 The majority of the control variables used in this study are factors that 
were identified as affecting audit fees, quality and satisfaction. These include 
FSAPUB, FSREV, INTAUD, CHANG5YR, AMTHRS, 1TAX, 2CONS, 
3BOOK, 4OTHER, INTCONTRL, INDUST and VALUSUGGE.   
FSAPUB, FSREV and INTAUD are components determining whether a 
company is audited or not.  FSAPUB measures whether a company is audited by 
a public accounting firm.  If a company is not audited by a public accounting 
firm, FSREV captures whether the company’s financial statements are reviewed 
by any accounting firm.  Having its own internal audit function (INTAUD) can 
help a firm build a professional relationship with external auditors and investors.  
The internal audit function can provide assurance to third parties as well.  Hiring 
an external auditor increases transparency for external investors and the 
management team.  External investors or third parties lack relevant information 
about the value, performance, financial position, risk, and investment 
opportunities of firms.  A lack of reliable information creates asymmetry, which 
can result in not maximizing investment policies and motivating employees 
(Bushman and Smith, 2005).   
CHANG5YR captures whether the client changed accounting firms after 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  While local and regional audit firms are dropping SEC 
clients, companies are also changing their auditors in order to reduce the audit fee 
(Ettredge, 2007).  After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, one of the main reasons for the 
fee increase is due to Section 404, which requires auditors to spend more time 
evaluating the internal control of a company (Whitehouse, 2002). Although 
private companies are not subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Section 404, 
overall changes in the audit environment after passage of the Act likely affected 
the extent of audit testing on all engagements.  AMTHRS measures the change of 
audit hours spent by a client’s accounting firm.   
 Publicly traded companies are prohibited from using non-audit services 
from their audit companies.  Non-audit services are strongly forbidden in order to 
maintain auditor independence (Burton, 1999).  However, there is no such a 
restriction on private companies.  1TAX, 2CONS, 3BOOK and 4OTHER 
captures any non-audit services provided by external accounting firms to measure 
the independence of audit firms and impact on the quality of audit provided.   
 The three control variables, INTCONTRL, INDUST and VALUSUGGE 
are components of audit quality tested by Carcello et al. (1992).  These variables 
are main elements that enhance the quality of audit.  Carcello et al. found that the 
audit team’s familiarity with the client’s internal control, knowledge of the 
industry, and responsiveness to the client are major factors determining the 
quality of audit.   
 
VI. RESULTS 
A. Response Rate 
The survey questionnaires were sent to 429 companies located around the 
Central New York area, regardless of whether the company was private or public.  
As shown in Table 2, among the 429 companies, 126 responses were received, a 
29.4% response rate.  Given the nature of the research, and the nature of the 
companies contacted, the response rate is considered satisfactory.   
TABLE 2 
Sample Characteristics 
Industry 
Sample 
Size 
Usable 
Responses 
Response 
Rate 
Advertising agencies 32 9 28% 
Architectural firms 29 11 38% 
Banks 28 13 46% 
Building supply companies 19 5 26% 
Commercial builders 25 12 48% 
Commercial printing companies 25 11 44% 
Credit unions 25 14 56% 
Cultural & performing art organizations 26 8 31% 
Durable medical equipment suppliers 18 9 50% 
Employment benefit consultant 29 5 17% 
Employment placement agencies 20 5 25% 
Engineering firms 31 9 29% 
Environmental consulting firms 21 1 5% 
Law firms 26 6 23% 
Residential builders 19 1 5% 
Software developers 19 4 21% 
Web-design & development firms 37 3 8% 
Total 429 126 29% 
 
B. Market Share 
 Among the accounting firms listed in the survey questionnaire, the Firley, 
Moran, Freer and Eassa, P.C. accounting firm has the greatest market share at 
12%.  Firley, Moran, Freer and Eassa, P.C. focuses on construction and real 
estate, credit unions, energy, manufacturing, professional and business services, 
and wholesale distribution/retail industries.  Since the company was established in 
1980, Firley, Moran, Freer and Eassa, P.C. concentrates on audit, tax, and 
management consulting services in the Central New York region.  Because of the 
accountant’s provincial focus and closeness to their clientele, Firley, Moran, Freer 
and Eassa captured a great portion of the market share.  In addition, there is 
substantial overlap in the industries surveyed and the industries on which Firley, 
Moran, Freer, and Eassa focuses. This is another reason that Firley, Moran, Freer 
and Eassa, P.C. has a great market share in the sample.   
 There is only a 7% total market share captured by Big 4 accounting firms 
combined.  Among the 7% market share, KPMG is the leading Big 4 accounting 
company with a 5% market share.  One of the major changes in the market share 
of these Big 4 Accounting firms is due to the recent office relocation by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in March of 2007.  Seven of the survey participants used 
PricewaterhouseCoopers as their auditing firm; however, due to the closing of the 
Syracuse office, these companies changed accounting firms.  In contrast, even 
though Ernst & Young has an office located in Mony Tower in downtown 
Syracuse, only one survey participant utilized its services.  The possible 
explanation is due to the premium charged by Big 4 auditors.  Craswell, Francis 
and Taylor examined 1484 Australian public companies to estimate audit 
premium earned by Big 8 auditors.  They found, on average, industry specialist 
Big 8 auditors charge a 34% premium compared to nonspecialist Big 8 auditors 
due to industry specialization and brand recognition.  In addition, they also found, 
on average, Big 8 audit firms receive 30% brand premiums over non-Big 8 
auditors.   
Another possible reason for low market share obtained by Big 4 firms is 
the scalability of Central New York companies.  Many regional companies are 
looking for regional firms that are familiar with the district’s business 
characteristics or trends.  Because these clients are mostly small to mid-size 
companies and locally run, they do not see the necessity of paying the premium 
due to an accounting firm’s reputation.  Besides the 14 accounting firms listed, 
Bonadio & Co. LLP, Evans & Bennett, Gustafson & Co., Kane, Bowles & Moor 
PC, Sciarabba Walker & Co., and Vieria and Associates, CPA were other 
accounting firms that provided services to more than two participants in this 
survey.  Table 3 shows the number of accounting firms used by survey 
participants and their market share.   
 
TABLE 3 
Market Share 
  Name of Accounting Firms 
Number of Companies Utilizing 
the Accounting Firm Market Share 
1 Beard Miller & Company 6 5% 
2 Bowers & Company 5 4% 
3 Dannible & McKee 4 3% 
4 Deloitte & Touche 1 1% 
5 Dermody, Burke & Brown 5 4% 
6 Ernst & Young 1 1% 
7 Fust Charles Chambers 4 3% 
8 Green & Seifter 4 3% 
9 Firley, Moran, Freer & Eassa 15 12% 
10 KPMG 6 5% 
11 Piaker & Lyons 3 2% 
12 PricewaterhouseCoopers 0 0% 
13 Sirchia & Cuomo, LLP 0 0% 
14 Testone Marshall & Discenza 4 3% 
15 Other: 63  52% 
      Bonadio & Co. LLP 2  
      EFP Group 2  
      Evans & Bennett 2  
      Gustafson & Co. 2  
      Kane, Bowles & Moore PC 4  
      Mengel, Metzger, Barr & Co. 3  
      Rinemard Fitzgerald  2  
      Sciarabba Walker & Co.  5  
      Vieira and Associates, CPA 2  
 
 
C. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample.  The table 
shows more than half of respondents are utilizing a public accounting firm to 
audit their financial statements.   
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive statistics – overall sample (N=126) 
 
 Dichotomous Variables   
Variable Mean SD  
FS audited 0.59 0.49  
FS reviewed 0.94 0.24  
Internal audit 0.56 0.50  
    
 Measured on a 5-point scale  
Variable Mean SD  
Level audit fee 2.43 0.77  
Amount audit hours 2.50 0.84  
Quality of audit 2.58 0.81  
    
 Measured on a 10-point scale 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Quality satisfaction 8.31 1.73 1-10 
Knowledgeable 8.43 1.76 1-10 
Company industry 7.88 2.02 1-10 
Suggestions 7.92 2.07 1-10 
    
 Continuous and discrete variables 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Years with accounting firm 13.07 10.21 1-60 
Total audit $98,640  $604,494  $400-5,000,000 
Total tax $8,817  $13,047  $400-68,000 
Total consulting $4,674  $6,336  $300-23,179 
Other $10,407  $17,879  $750-70,000 
Total other  $60,351  $446,206  $300-5,010,000 
 
 Of the companies that did not have an audit by a public accounting firm, 
52 survey respondents, 94% of the companies’ financial statements were 
reviewed by an accounting firm based on the second questionnaire that was asked.  
Among the total of 126 respondents, only half of these companies maintain an 
internal audit function.   
 In terms of changes in level of audit fee, amount of audit hours spent by 
auditors and quality of audit provided by accounting firm, clients responded that 
they experienced slight increases in all three of these elements after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  Based on the 5-scale measurement, the results were 2.43, 2.50, and 
2.58 respectively.   
 After measuring the audit quality satisfaction, accounting firm knowledge 
of the company’s internal control, industry, and suggestions, respondents are 
satisfied with services that their accounting firms are providing.  In the Central 
New York region, the average accounting firm tenure with the client is about 13 
years.  The total audit fee ranged from $400 to $5,000,000 because of the 
different size of companies; however, the average company spends $98,640 per 
year for audit services.  Total audit fees were significantly greater than other non-
audit services.   
 
VII. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 I initially included the FSREV variable (if financial statements are not 
audited by a public accounting firm, they are reviewed by an accounting firm) 
when I developed the model.  After running the regression analysis based on the 
initial model, only 37 cases were used out of the 126 observations due to 89 
missing cases for the FSREV variable.  FSREV questionnaire does not apply to 
participants whose financial statements are audited by a public accounting firm.  
Participants who responded for the FSREV variable imply their financial 
statements are not audited by a public accounting firm.  Therefore, participants 
accordingly responded to the FSREV questionnaire based on whether their 
financial statements are reviewed by an accounting firm or not.   
 Table 5 below shows the relationship between each Y-variable and X-
variables.  Among the clients audited by a public accounting firms, FSAPUB 
(Financial statements audited by a public accounting firm), FSREV (financial 
statements reviewed by an accounting firm), and 3BOOK (utilizing bookkeeping 
service) are not included in the regression analysis because all values are 0 or 
constant.   
A. The Level of Audit Fee 
 As stated in hypothesis 1, the level of audit fee increased after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Survey participants responded that they experienced slight 
increases of their audit fees for the last 5 years.  The mean of the level of audit 
fees category was 2.43 with the standard deviation of 0.77, which indicates a 
slight increase in the level of audit fees.  S&P 500 companies have experienced a 
24% audit fee increase from 2002 to 2003 due to the enforcement of Section 404 
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Foley and Lardner, 2005).  Just like public companies, 
these local private companies also experienced a small increase in the level of 
audit fees.  According to George Victor, chair of the NYSSCPA’s SEC Practice 
Committee, accounting firms increase the bill because they realize the value of 
the services that they provide to their clients.   
Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the accounting firms could not increase 
the fee because they were outbidding each other.  Therefore, the competition 
maintained or brought down the price of the audit.  Nevertheless, the true value of 
audit services is valued and private companies are under pressure to develop 
internal controls similar to public companies.  Companies need to accommodate 
resources to enhance the internal controls.  Therefore, private sectors experience 
the spillover from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in public companies (Victor, 2005).   
This research also found that among companies that are audited by public 
accounting firms, as the level of fee increased, the quality of audit was enhanced.   
Higher audit fees are related to the audit firms’ desire to maintain their reputation 
(DeAngelo, 1981).  Palmrose (1988) found that the larger accounting firms are 
involved in less litigation compared to smaller audit firms.  In addition, the 
increase in audit fee is a result of better and updated technologies that lead to 
more accurate audits (Wooten, 2003).  Since private sector companies are 
pressured to improve internal controls similar to public companies, it requires 
auditors to spend more time and resources to test internal controls (Victor, 2005).   
 Unlike these companies with their financial statements audited by public 
accounting firms, private companies that are not audited by a public accounting 
firm show a negative relationship between LEVELAFEE (the level of audit fee) 
and QUALITYA (the quality of audit).  The decreases in audit fees bring the 
concern of lower audit quality in response.  Deis and Giroux (1992, 1996) found 
from the governmental sector that the audit quality is higher for initial audit 
engagement teams.  In addition, as the number of bidders for the audit 
engagement is higher, the audit quality increases (Copley and Doucet, 1993).   
 Finally, the research regression model found that LEVELAFEE and 
CHANGE5YR (auditor changes within 5 years) have a negative relationship for 
both participants that are audited and not audited by a public accounting firm.  
Changing auditors is costly for clients.  In order to compensate the costs in an 
auditor change, audit firms lower the initial biddings.  The companies are able to 
maintain a lower audit fee by constantly changing auditors (Ettredge and 
Greenberg, 1990).  Clients that are small enough to hire a non-Big 4 auditors tend 
to switch from Big 4 auditors to non-Big 4 firms (Ettredge, Li, Scholz, 2007).  As 
a result, the increases in audit fees are lower for companies that changed auditors 
over the past five years compared to companies that did not change auditors.   
Table 5 describes each variable that has an impact on the level of audit fee 
changes and its relationship.  Even though there were 74 companies audited by a 
public accounting firm and 52 companies that are reviewed by an accounting 
firm, only 70 and 37 samples are used respectively due to missing variables in the 
responses.   
TABLE 5 
Level Audit Fee and Variables  
 
        Audited by              Reviewed by 
      a public acc firm         an accounting firm 
Predictor       Coef       Coef 
# of Observ      70      37 
R-Sq   43.00%  59.40% 
Constant      1.3388       1.365     
FSAPUB              *             -0.6598    
FSREV                *                1.0743    
INTAUD      -0.0702                      -0.5338    
CHANGE5YR   -0.0810              -1.0236    
AMTHRS        0.42552              0.3880    
QUALITYA     0.1072              -0.3807    
SATWQUAL   0.07634              0.1684   
0NONE           -1.0839              -0.9987    
1TAX         -0.8510              -0.8527    
2CONS        0.1061              -0.2810    
3BKKP             *                      0.2555    
4OTHER        -0.9852               0.2658   
 
B.  Audit Quality 
 In this study, among the companies whose financial statements are audited 
by a public accounting firms, the quality of the audit is positively associated with 
the LEVELAFEE and CHANGE5YR.   DeAngelo (1981) proved that larger audit 
firms have greater independence from their clients because each individual client 
is immaterial.  In addition to DeAngelo’s argument, independent research 
conducted by Hoitash, Markelevich and Barragato (2005) studied companies that 
have changed their auditors after the Sarbanes-Oxley.  These researchers 
concluded that the increase in auditor independence resulted in an increase in 
audit quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Just as these studies found in publicly 
traded companies, private sector companies also experienced the same 
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley: the level of audit fees increase the audit quality.   
 In addition to the audit fee, a change of audit firms within five years has a 
positive relationship with audit quality.  Myers and Omer (2003) researched the 
relationship between auditors and clients in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act era.  The 
study addressed whether mandatory partner rotation of audit firms led to the 
increase in audit quality and auditor tenure.  Furthermore, it has been often found 
that private companies tend to hire larger audit firms when they are at the stage of 
an initial public offering (IPO).  The private companies going public hire larger 
accounting firms because larger audit firms are able to bear the risk, which 
provides assurance to investors (Antle, 1982).  Regardless of IPO concerns, in this 
research, the changes in the audit firms within five years enhanced audit quality.   
Contrary to DeAngelo’s argument that audit fee increases the level of 
audit quality, DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam (2002) argued that 
auditors sacrifice their independence in order to retain the client with a large audit 
fees.  Thus, audit fees become a potential influence on the auditor independence 
because they create an economic bond.  In this research, Defond, Raghunandan, 
and Subramanyam’s finding was found among a group of companies that are not 
audited by a public accounting firm.  The responses indicated a negative 
relationship between the quality of services and level of fees.  Considering the 
size of these private firms, their audit fees are not large enough to create an 
economic bond with accounting firms.  Therefore, as the fee goes down, the 
quality of services increases among smaller companies.   
 Interesting research conducted by Detling (2004) found that changing the 
auditor will lower the level of assurance because successor auditors need to gather 
essential evidence.  Detling found that the greater level of assurance needs a 
higher level of evidence or a qualified auditor.  Based on the fact that the 
successor charges a lower fee than the predecessor, there is a potential that the 
audit is not as complete or of as high a quality as the predecessor’s.  In addition, 
lowering audit fee will increase the risk in the client’s portfolio due to the fact that 
the auditor will not test more or run a complete qualified audit in order to fit into 
the low budget.   
 Due to the increase in audit fees as the consequence of the Section 404, 
many clients that are feasible enough to be audited by Big 4 accounting firms tend 
to change their auditors.  These clients often hire a regional auditor to avoid an 
additional premium charge (Ettredge, 2007).  Among the survey participants, 
about 24 participants, or 20% of the total participants, switched their accounting 
firms within the last five years.   One of the most common reasons was the recent 
office relocation of PricewaterhouseCoopers in the Syracuse downtown area.  
Eleven participants used to utilize the service provided by one of Big Four 
companies, while thirteen of them hired non-Big Four audit firm.   Among the 16 
reasons provided for switching, three of these participants reduced the size of the 
accounting firm, while four of them switched accounting firms to obtain greater 
expertise or to expand the business.  Even in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era, there 
are some companies that changed to larger accounting firms due to the complexity 
of the business.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine whether clients 
downsized the accounting firms or not because the direction of change was not 
asked in the questionnaire.  A change of audit firm due to political or service 
issues is difficult to measure in the direction of whether these participants hired 
larger accounting firm or not.    
 Table 6 describes the change in audit quality and its relative variables.  An 
interesting observation in this case is the R-square of audited by a public 
accounting firm is 25.6%, while the R-square of companies whose financial 
statements are reviewed by an accounting firm is 62.10%.  There is a significant 
difference between the two samples. Since audit quality is subjective, the 
difference between the two categories of respondents is not necessarily surprising.   
      TABLE 6 
Audit Quality and Variables 
        Audited by              Reviewed by 
      a public acc firm         an accounting firm 
Predictor       Coef     Coef   
# of Observ     70      37 
R-Sq   25.60%           62.10% 
Constant       3.0816   3.455     
FSAPUB          *            -0.6119    
FSREV             *             0.8068    
INTAUD                -0.1173              -0.2427    
CHANGE5YR  0.1077              -1.4979    
AMTHRS        0.2059               0.3690    
LEVELAFEE   0.1416              -0.4861    
SATWQUAL             -0.1959             -0.0159    
0NONE        0.5115              -0.8647    
1TAX         0.2868              -0.6510    
2CONS                 -0.0195              -0.3199    
3BKKP            *            -1.0662   
4OTHER     0.1250               0.0238  
 
C. Client Satisfaction  
 The client satisfaction is positively associated with the audit firm’s 
knowledge of the client’s internal control and valuable suggestions given to the 
management team.  As Carcello, Hermanson and McGrath (1992) found in their 
research with Fortune 1000 companies, audit team and firm experience with the 
client is one of the most important components that determines the quality of 
audit and satisfaction.  Other factors are industry expertise, audit firm 
responsiveness to client needs such as responding in a timely manner and 
compliance with general audit standards.  Higher audit quality leads to a higher 
client satisfaction.  The research proves that client satisfaction with the audit team 
is a positive attribute (Behn, Carcello, and Hermmanson, 1997).  Service quality 
is measured in five dimensions by Parasuraman (1988).  These are 
responsiveness, assurance, empathy, tangibles, and reliability.  In addition to 
Parasuraman’s measurement, a quality service includes the audit firm’s 
knowledge of the client’s internal control and valuable suggestions to 
management (Carcello, 1992).  Therefore, a quality service provided by an 
accounting firm will enhance client satisfaction.   
In this research, the industry expertise and satisfaction have a negative 
relationship, which is contrary to Carcello’s argument.  Industry experts are 
important for publicly traded companies because these experts not only provide 
proficient knowledge, but also emphasize the reputation and firm’s image that is 
important to external investors for a security purpose.  The firm’s image is 
influential to customer perception on the firm’s service and operations (Zeithaml 
and Bitner, 2000).  Nevertheless, these small local private companies have fewer 
external investors and the accounting firm reputation is not as important so that 
the industry expert is not valued as much.   
Another interesting finding in this research is that client satisfaction and 
audit firm tenure have a negative association.  On average, the local companies 
located in the Central New York region used the same accounting firm for 13.07 
years.  The number of years with an accounting firm ranged from 1 to 60 among 
126 participants.  The research finds that as the accounting firm’s tenure 
decreases, client satisfaction goes up.  Nevertheless, only 19% of these 
participants changed their auditors within the five years after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.   
Client satisfaction and audit fee are highly interrelated, although previous 
studies find differing results.  Monroe and Grewal (1991) and Teas and Agarwal 
(2000) found a negative relation between client satisfaction and audit fees, while 
Peterson and Wilson (1985) concluded there is no relationship between the two 
variables.  However, in this research, regional companies have a positive 
association between client satisfaction and the audit fee.  Zeithaml and Bitner 
(2000) stated that one of the most important aspects of service is the price of the 
service.  Higher price sets greater expectation of the audit quality so that clients 
assume/expect a higher fee with higher audit quality.   
 Table 7 describes the relationship between client satisfaction and variables 
that determines the factor.  A high R-square shows that there is a strong 
relationship in this data.  This also means that 63.5% and 81.4% of the variations 
in the data is explained by the model.   
TABLE 7 
Satisfaction and Variables 
 
        Audited by              Reviewed by 
      a public acc firm         an accounting firm 
Predictor          Coef          Coef   
# of Observ    70       37 
R-Sq   63.50%    81.40% 
Constant           1.4998       4.110     
FSAPUB              *    -0.1254    
FSREV                *    -0.470     
INTAUD          -0.4312      -0.6096    
YEARSACCFIRM   -0.00090     -0.02703   
CHANGE5YR      -0.2872      -0.1028   
0NONE            0.5078      -0.1114    
1TAX            0.7763       0.0430    
2CONS           0.4238      -0.3210    
3BKKP              *    -0.2968    
4OTHER       -0.7051       -0.4955    
INTCONTRL     0.6029           0.4790    
INDUST          -0.0305      -0.0464    
VALUSUGGEST     0.2017       0.2597    
 
VIII. Conclusion  
 Since there are few studies that investigate the influence of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on regional firms, I decided to focus on finding associations between 
(1) audit fees and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (2) audit fees, changes in auditors, and 
the audit quality, and (3) the client satisfaction and the accounting firm’s audit 
fee, knowledge of the client’s internal control and suggestions.   
 It is widely presumed that audit fees have increased for publicly traded 
companies in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act era (Foley and Lardner, 2005).  Just 
like these public companies, small regional firms also experienced increases in 
audit fees due to increases in the value of services.  In addition to the increased 
value of audit services, development of internal controls similar to public 
companies contributed to the increase in the level of audit fees.   
 There are interrelated findings in audit fees, changes in auditors and the 
audit quality.  Among the survey participants, those who are audited by a public 
accounting firm experienced an enhancement in audit quality with auditor 
changes and increases in the level of audit fees.  However, companies that use an 
accounting firm to review their financial statements experienced the opposite 
result.  They experience an increase in audit quality as the level of audit fees 
decreases.   
 A client’s satisfaction increases as the audit firm is more knowledgeable in 
the client’s internal control and provides valuable suggestions to the management 
team.  Even though previous research proved that the industry specialists boost 
client satisfaction (Carcello et al. 1992), in this research, there was a negative 
relationship between industry specialists and client satisfaction.  This may be due 
to the fact that utilizing industry specialists requires a premium, and private 
companies may not benefit from the higher cost of a specialist auditor.   
One of the limitations of the current study is that the size of the participant 
companies is not incorporated in the models.  Many previous research studies 
emphasize the importance of client size in terms of audit fees, etc.  However, in 
order to keep the confidentiality of survey participants, the size of client was not 
asked in the questionnaire. Excluding the size of the client from the models may 
limit the generalizability of the study.    
Among the participants who terminated their auditors within the last five 
years, if the direction of the auditor change were asked, the result could have been 
more useful.  Previous studies prove that many mid-size companies changed from 
Big 4 accounting firm to local accounting firms in order to save the premium 
charges (Antle, 1982).  However, if smaller companies are planning an initial 
public offering, they tend to switch their auditors from smaller accounting firms 
to one of the Big Four firms for the reputation and risk bearing (Zeithaml and 
Bitner, 2000).  In this survey, there was a limitation of only asking the changes of 
the auditors, not the direction.   
Among the participants whose financial statements are reviewed by an 
accounting firm, they have a negative relationship between client satisfaction and 
the number of years spent with an accounting firm.  It can be interpreted that the 
frequent changes in an auditor will lead to a greater audit satisfaction.  In future 
research, looking into how often these clients change accounting firms might be 
helpful in understanding how auditors changes help maintain audit satisfaction.   
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Appendix 
 
1. Are your financial statements audited by a public accounting firm? Yes No 
   (If yes, please skip to question #3) 
 
 
2. If not, are your financial statements reviewed by an accounting firm? Yes   No 
 
 
 
3. Do you have an internal audit function?   Yes No  
 
 
 
4. Please choose the firm that serves your company:  
 
_____  Beard Miller & Company 
_____  Bowers & Company  
_____ Dannible & McKee 
_____ Deloitte & Touche  
_____ Dermody, Burke & Brown  
_____  Ernst & Young 
_____  Fust Charles Chambers 
_____ Green & Seifter  
 
 
5. For how many years has the accounting firm audited your company?  ________ 
 
 
6. If you changed an accounting firm within last 5 years: 
 
 a. Name of previous accounting firm _______________ 
 
 b. Reason for change:  
 
 
 
7. Considering the services provided by your accounting firm for the last 5 years,  
a. The level of audit fees has: 
 
 Significantly     Slightly      Consistent    Slightly Significantly 
   Increased   Increased     with inflation    Decreased   Decreased 
 
 
b. The amount of audit hours spent by the firm: 
 
 Significantly      Slightly   Consistent     Slightly Significantly 
_____ Firley, Moran, Freer & Eassa 
_____ KPMG 
_____ Piaker & Lyons 
_____ PricewaterhouseCoopers 
_____ Sirchia & Cuomo, LLP 
_____ Testone Marshall & Discenza 
Other: ____________________ 
 
   Increased    Increased     Decreased   Decreased 
 
 c. The quality of the audit provided by the accounting firm: 
 
 Significantly      Slightly Remained about    Slightly Significantly 
   Increased     Increased        the same     Decreased   Decreased 
  
 
8. Please indicate your satisfaction with the quality of the audit firm 
 
       Extremely               Extremely  
       Dissatisfied                 Neutral            Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
9. Is your company utilizing any other services from the accounting firm (circle 
all that apply)?  
 
None  Tax     Consulting        Bookkeeping  Other ______  
 
 
10. Total fees for fiscal 2007 Audit           $_______________ 
      Total fees for fiscal 2007 Tax              $_______________ 
      Total fees for fiscal 2007 Consulting   $_______________ 
      Total fees for fiscal 2007 Other           $_______________ 
 
 
 
11. The accounting firm is knowledgeable and familiar with your firm’s internal 
control.   
       Strongly                           Strongly 
       Disagree                 Neutral           Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
12. The accounting firm is knowledgeable in your company’s industry.   
       Strongly                           Strongly 
       Disagree                 Neutral           Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
13. The accounting firm provided valuable suggestions to management.   
       Strongly                           Strongly 
        Disagree                 Neutral           Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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